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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different 
levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure 
are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of 
the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved 
governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find 
strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau’s 
dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in 
badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We 
show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and 
infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or 
bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is 
quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves. 
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The literature studying the effect of governance on illegal activity shows that as the 
quality of governance increases the importance of the informal sector shrinks and the intensity 
and seriousness of crime is reduced (e.g. Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1998; Loayza, 
1996). The common starting point in this literature is to assume that there is a government 
(which can be more or less corrupt or effective at catching criminals) and a legal sector where 
profitable business activity may be conducted. Entrepreneurs choose which sector to operate 
in depending on (expected) sanctions and rewards. However, these assumptions are not 
universally applicable. Firstly, some governments do not control (all of) their territory. This 
may be because of complete state failure or because they have abdicated governance to 
separatist groups, which may tolerate or even support organised crime. Secondly, economic 
opportunities may be altogether limited by the lack of enforceable contracts, secure property 
rights and/or a lack of infrastructure for getting goods to markets. Criminal gangs need 
infrastructure and markets, both to create opportunities for stealing and to turn their loot into 
cash. By combining operations in the shadow and legal economies, criminals can further 
increase the profitability of their operations.  
We therefore hypothesise that at the bottom of the governance spectrum, illegal 
activity would benefit from improvements in governance, which aid the functioning of 
markets. There should be a “sweet spot” on the governance spectrum where markets function 
well enough to enable lucrative criminal activity, while law enforcement is still too weak 
and/or officials too corrupt to provide an effective threat of sanctions. Once governance 
improves beyond this point we expect to observe the established result that crime is 
decreasing in governance. 
Countries at the bottom of the governance scale have so far been systematically 
excluded from the empirical literature on governance, because these countries do not report 
reliable data on illegal activity. In this paper we look at the relationship between the incidence 
of piracy and the quality of governance. The International Maritime Bureau’s piracy dataset 
used here does not rely on local data collection, but on ship-owners’ reports of various types 
of maritime crime. It therefore presents us with a unique opportunity to study what happens in 
the informal sector when there is complete or near state failure.  
 
At the same time the problem of piracy itself is of increasing political and academic 
interest.  The recent explosion of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the spiralling cost of 
providing maritime security (privately or through naval intervention) mean that we need to 3 
 
                                                
evaluate different strategies to combat piracy.
1 Most commentators agree that piracy is a 
problem which is best resolved on land: Percy and Shortland (2010) argue, for example, that 
naval intervention can reduce the problem at best and at worst simply shift it elsewhere. 
According to Treves (2009), there is little appetite for repeated incursions into sovereign 
states’ territories to pursue pirates into their lairs, even where UN Security Council 
resolutions explicitly authorise this
2. Increasing the ability and willingness of a government to 
intervene to stop piracy is therefore widely accepted as the key to resolving a country’s piracy 
problems (see Boots, 2009; Kraska and Wilson, 2008 or Menkhaus, 2009).  
Therefore answering the question of under what conditions piracy emerges and 
establishes itself as a business model is paramount for designing a successful response to 
maritime insecurity. Echoing the literature on crime and governance, much of the current 
debate links piracy to state failure
3. There is an explicit or implicit assumption that we can 
reduce piracy by stabilising conflict regions and strengthening state structures
4. However, as 
shown by Coggins (2010b), most “failed states” do not produce (significant amounts of) 
piracy
5. Instead, piracy is endemic in countries with weak (but not hopeless) governance such 
as Nigeria, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Bangladesh. Diagram 1 illustrates this point. 
 
Piracy is therefore well suited to illustrate and examine the hypothesised non-linear 
relationship between governance and illegal activity. As governance improves from the 
lowest levels, pirates find it easier to run their businesses. As markets develop, more foreign 
ships arrive to trade in a country’s harbours. Pirates need to worry less about their booty being 
contested on land and can use existing infrastructure and markets to unload and sell their loot. 
Piracy will therefore rise both in terms of the number of attacks and in their ambition. The 
“sweet spot” for pirates on the governance spectrum occurs where (possibly informal) 
governance structures ensure contract security and physical infrastructure while government 
officials turn a blind eye. Only once governance improves beyond the “optimal” piracy point, 
 
1 See for example Boots (2009), Kraska (2008 and 2009), Kraska and Wilson (2008, 2009a and 2009b), 
Menkhaus (2009) 
2 Sending the naval gunboats into pirate havens was the way piracy has traditionally been resolved. 
3 For a typical example see “Anarchy on land means piracy at sea” 
  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/opinion/12kaplan.html 
4 House of Lords, European Union Committee: Combating Somali Piracy 
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf,  
State Department Briefing on U.S. Efforts on Anti-Piracy 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/February/20100218165748eaifas0.4240795.html#ixzz0ywcvKVXv  
5  The exception to this rule would appear to be Somalia, which has failed in the sense that the government in 
Mogadishu does not control the (somewhat artificial) state of Somalia. However, Coggins (2010a) shows that 
piracy emanates from areas within Somalia which are relatively stable.  4 
 
                                                
are improvements in governance reflected in a reduction in (the profitability of) piracy 
(diagram 2).  
 
We disaggregate the dataset on piracy compiled by the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) into various types of piracy (minor and major theft, hostage-taking, hijack and ransom, 
“phantom ships”). We show that the most lucrative forms of piracy are associated not with 
pervasive state failure and anarchy, but with a combination of relatively effective 
governments and pervasive corruption. A further opportunity for piracy to develop is the 
phenomenon of “pockets of lawlessness” where a government has lost control over part of its 
territory to groups tolerant of piracy that are able to provide relatively stable business 
conditions
6. For minor acts of piracy we show that the probability of piracy being reported 
from a location, as well as its intensity and persistence follow a quadratic pattern. We also 
show that the previously established highly significant negative linear relationship between 
governance and crime is present in the IMB dataset – once we exclude the least well governed 
countries from the sample. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the relevant literature 
and formulate our research hypotheses. In section 3 we introduce our data and discuss our 
modelling strategy. In section 4 we discuss our results, section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Crime, the (shadow) economy and governance 
Since Becker’s seminal (1968) paper on the economics of crime, crime and illegal 
sector activity have come to be perceived as a maximisation problem. Agents make a rational 
choice of whether to commit crimes depending on the rewards of crime as compared to 
various alternative activities, the probability of being detected and punished (and to a lesser 
extent) the severity of the threatened punishment. People commit crimes, if the expected pay-
off from engaging in criminal activity exceeds that from legitimate market activities. The 
relationship between criminal activity and income (inequality), unemployment, education, 
socioeconomic background, arrest probability and various forms of punishment has been 
explored extensively using household and regional panels in a number of developed countries 
and emerging markets. Buonanno (2003) provides a useful overview of the literature.  
 
6 This argument can be made for example for Puntland in Somalia and the delta region in Nigeria 5 
 
 
The literature on the effects of governance on legal and illegal activities tests some of 
the insights from the literature on the economics of crime at the macro-economic level. Given 
the importance of the probability of punishment in deciding whether or not to engage in 
criminal activity, improvements in a country’s governance should help to suppress illegal 
activity. Indeed, the empirical studies discussed here demonstrate a clear negative, linear 
relationship between various aspects of illegal activity and the quality of governance. Azfar 
and Gurgur (2005) show that the incidence of different types of crime is associated with 
higher levels of corruption and lower levels of government effectiveness.  Fisman and Wei 
(2007) and Berger and Nitsch (2008) present evidence from trade statistics that a higher level 
of corruption is associated with increased smuggling activities. Loayza (1996) shows that the 
informal sector grows with lower levels of governance (and an increasing bureaucratic 
burden). According to his theoretical model, this effect is related to the increased costs of 
accessing the formal sector, as well as the costs of remaining in the formal sector. In another 
theoretical contribution, Azuma and Grossman (2008) find that under fairly general 
conditions, it can often be optimal to belong to the informal sector when a government is not 
found to be benevolent. Friedman et al. (2000) show empirically that business can be driven 
underground by pervasive bureaucracy and corruption. Kaufman (2004) uses a business 
survey to show that issues like corruption serve as a strong impediment to doing business, 
particularly in non-OECD countries.  
 
Complementing this research there are a number of studies which demonstrate that 
legal economic activities are positively affected by improvements in governance. Chang et al. 
(2009) argue that improvements in governance are necessary for a country to be able to obtain 
the benefits of trade liberalisation. After all, only when the internal and external obstacles are 
removed, can businesses successfully expand. Weill (2009) finds that corruption in most cases 
reduces bank lending, thereby further affecting growth possibilities of legitimate 
organisations. This finding echoes the results by Levine (1999), who looks at the relationship 
between the quality of financial institutions and long-run economic growth, and Djankov et 
al. (2007), who use a cross-country analysis to show that legal protection of creditors 
increases total lending.  
 
Overall therefore, there is good evidence that as governance improves the scope for 
and profitability of legal private sector activity rises, while illegal activities are increasingly 6 
 
                                                
suppressed. However, all these papers (explicitly or implicitly) assume that a functioning 
state, as well as a formal sector, continues to exist alongside the informal / illegal sector. It is 
not clear from this literature what the effects on the informal sector of a complete breakdown 
of state authority would be.  
One might reasonably argue that in the case of anarchy or state failure, opportunities 
for both formal and informal sector businesses are severely limited. Any entrepreneurial 
activity, whether legal or illegal, which involves the production, storage or sale of goods 
requires at least some enforcement of property rights and a modicum of contract security and 
stability
7. Profitable “organised crime” thrives on existing market structures, as is 
demonstrated by the case of the Mafia in Italy and the USA. Indeed, sociological research on 
organised crime has pointed out for a long time that criminal groups often combine their 
illegal activities with legitimate business ownership, thereby increasing profits from both 
types of activities (Graebner-Anderson, 1979).  We therefore postulate that the scope and 
ambition of illegal business is increasing as governance improves at least for the lower part of 
the governance spectrum. 
 
2.1.2 Governance and Data Collection 
So far the empirical economic literature has been unable to explore illegal activity in 
badly governed countries. This is not surprising, given that state failure results in the complete 
breakdown of data collection
8. Even when a state has some data collection capacity, there 
may be severe concerns about data quality: Soares (2004) and Azfar and Gurgur (2005) show 
that the willingness to report crime is negatively correlated with institutional quality and 
corruption. Because of this association between state weakness and the absence of (reliable) 
data, the states at the very bottom of the governance spectrum have been systematically 
excluded from the governance studies cited above
9.  
 
The measure of crime used in this study is exceptional in that it does not suffer from 
this dearth of data problem. It is based on the maritime piracy database published annually by 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). This collates the reports of ship-owners who 
 
7 Dixit (2004) in his book on “Lawlessness and Economics” points out that under conditions of anarchy it is 
easier to wait for someone else to produce something and then steal it than to engage in production. Similarly 
large-scale theft (from outsiders) is only lucrative if the booty is not immediately contested.  
8 For example the IMF’s 2009 assessment of Somalia simply stated that the Somali government “has not been 
able to restore order” and that the “absence of an internationally recognized government and official information 
about economic and financial developments precludes a full assessment…”  
9 Also see Lemke (2004) on the systematic absence of African countries in the International Relations literature. 7 
 
                                                
experienced (attempted) attacks on their ships with varying degrees of sophistication and 
economic damage caused. It provides us with a global record of a criminal activity – 
including countries where the local police are too stretched or too corrupt to collect data. The 
IMB defines piracy as any “armed maritime crime”. This is much more inclusive than that 
provided by the UNCLOS
10. For the purpose of this paper, the IMB’s broad definition of 
piracy is very helpful, as most maritime crimes are directed against ships at anchor and 
against steaming ships in territorial waters.  
The IMB database allows us to consider which types of maritime crime are associated 
with different domestic conditions. The reported incidents range from incidents of small-scale 
theft of cash or “quantities of rope” and “300 litres of paint”, via the hijack-and-ransom of 
large super-tankers to the complete disappearance of large cargo vessels and their load.
11 We 
thus have information on a range of criminal activities from small-scale (armed) robbery to 
organized crime, independent of whether or not a state has control over its territory and is able 
to collect reliable data.We also include unsuccessful attacks in some model specifications, as 
not every successful attack is reported and we may get a better picture of the incidence of 
piracy when we include everything that is reported.
12 
 
 2.1.3 Models of Piracy 
Potential explanations for the emergence of piracy abound, though few of these 
explanations have been tested formally in large-n studies (Murphy, 2007 and Sörenson, 
2008). The first common theme in the qualitative analyses is “opportunity” such as a 
favourable geography, busy harbours and / or proximity to trade routes. Secondly, would-be 
pirates need access to the “means” of piracy, such as boats, capable sea-men, weapons and 
men trained in their use. Thirdly, the emergence of piracy might be aided by a “motive” such 
as poverty, economic crises or enforcement of fishing rights. Finally, the ability and 
willingness of a government to intervene to stop piracy is a crucial factor in determining the 
 
10 The UNCLOS in Article 101 provides the following definition of piracy: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm  
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 
the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or 
property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.  
11 The IMB reports also includes both successful and unsuccessful attacks, though the latter may not legally be 
acts of piracy at all, see: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703988304575413470900570834.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEAD
NewsCollection 
12 Piracy (however defined) is likely to be underreported. Ship-owners may have an incentive not to report piracy 
in order not to inform insurers or because the bureaucratic implications of reporting outweigh the potential 
benefit thereof.  8 
 
                                                
emergence and the amount of piracy in a location
13. Lack of government intervention might 
arise from legal and jurisdictional weaknesses, lack of resources to enforce the law, or a 
country being embroiled in violent conflict.  
 
The precise effect of governance is being debated. Many commentators argue that 
state breakdown or state weakness creates conditions of anarchy in which (organised) crime 
can flourish. This appears consistent with piracy emanating from countries such as Somalia, 
often portrayed as the archetypal “failed state”. Proponents of this argument see the solution 
of the piracy problem in strengthening central government.  
On the other hand, according to Coggins (2010b), most failed states do not produce 
significant amounts of piracy. Sörenson (2008) points out that boarding and hijacking a ship 
does not present a real problem. The real challenge is to remain in control for a sufficiently 
long time to extract a profit (through extortion or sale of cargo or hull). This requires access to 
secure refuges and markets. Indeed, Percy and Shortland (2010) show that the time pattern of 
piracy in Somalia suggests that piracy was significantly reduced in times of instability, 
uncertainty and violent conflict. Within Somalia most pirate incidents appear to be emanating 
from Puntland: an area of the country in which there is informal governance and some degree 
of stability rather than the anarchy of Southern and Central Somalia (Coggins, 2010a). This 
would suggest that the effects of governance on piracy are indeed non-linear. Conditions of 
complete anarchy are bad for pirates. Moderate order may be better than moderate disorder 
when piracy is an organised business (Percy and Shortland, 2010). Only highly effective 
governments would be able to stamp out piracy altogether.   
 
2.2 Considerations on Piracy and Quality of Governance 
Piracy is at its most lucrative when pirates are able to steal (large) ships with their 
cargo, unload the cargo and give the ship a new identity to sell it off. This form of piracy, 
which is associated particularly with the Malacca Straits, needs to be run like a business
14. 
Pirates need a reliable network of subcontractors, customers for their booty and sufficient 
stability to ensure that profits are not eroded by turf wars between rival pirate groups. It also 
requires a good physical infrastructure for unloading cargo and giving ships a new identity. 
High-end piracy therefore needs functioning market structures and an administration which 
 
13  Murphy (2007) and Sörenson (2008) distinguish between states which are too weak to discourage piracy, 
those which allow piracy and those which encourage piracy. 
14 Leeson (2007) eloquently makes the point that in the 17
th and 18
th century  pirates had  developed clear 
internal governance structures and were highly organised criminals. 9 
 
                                                
tolerates the use of suitable port facilities by criminal groups while providing security for the 
pirate operation.
15 This combination is likely to be very rare.  
The “Hijack and Ransom” form of piracy carried out in Somalia is rather less 
profitable, but only requires a very basic physical infrastructure. Hijacked ships are anchored 
several nautical miles off the coast while ransom negotiations are conducted over the safe 
return of the crew. In the meantime some or most of the hostages are taken off the ship and 
looked after in local households to ensure that the international naval forces do not try and 
liberate the ship and its crew. It is essential to keep the hostages alive and safe from potential 
attacks by rival groups. Percy and Shortland (2010) show that even this form of piracy needs 
stability and contract security. In terms of governance it needs a more pervasive form of state 
failure: pirates are completely open about conducting ransom negotiations from ships 
anchored for months on end within territorial waters, as state forces are unwilling or unable to 
intervene.  
In the more basic “Kidnapping” form of piracy, the crew is taken off the ship and 
ransoms are demanded for their safe return (e.g. Nigeria). This form of piracy is less lucrative, 
as the ship owners have less to lose commercially by dragging out the ransom negotiations to 
lower the final ransom payment
16. There are two possible reasons why a piracy business 
would choose to operate in this way. Either the government is too effective and would 
interrupt ransom negotiations conducted openly from boats moored in territorial waters. Or, 
alternatively, if government weakness is pervasive and several criminal gangs operate 
undisturbed, the ship could be contested by rival gangs, who rather than attacking a ship in the 
open sea would prefer to steal someone else’s hostages. Therefore pirates hide their hostages 
on land. At the lowest level of governance the only form of piracy which is possible are hit 
and run acts of theft of ship’s stores and cash – something that even a relatively well governed 
country will find difficult to stamp out entirely
17. 
 
Diagram 2 illustrates the relationship between piracy and governance we have in 
mind. As the quality of governance improves the scope and ambition of acts of piracy initially 
increases. Other things equal, better governed territories attract more shipping traffic and 
increase opportunities for piracy. Infrastructure improves and pirates do not have to worry as 
much about their profits being contested by rival gangs. From a certain point onwards, other 
 
15 This is exactly the set of conditions under which piracy flourished in former times – for example the Barbary 
Corsairs in Morocco under Sultan Moulay Ismael and the Elizabethan “Privateers”.  
16 The lost “cost of hire” during ransom negotiations in Somalia often exceeds the cost of the final ransom. 
17 Even countries with excellent governance find it difficult to stamp out violent crime entirely, as the experience 
of the US anti-drugs campaign shows. Also see Erikson and Parent (2007) 10 
 
forms of economic activity become more attractive and there is a natural attrition out of piracy 
and into other forms of business. As the state begins to assert control over its territorial waters 
– not least because it has increasing interest in safeguarding its imports and exports – this will 
encourage more pirates to exit the business and go straight. A highly effective a government 
will see only occasional incidents of the pettiest forms of piracy. 
 
2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
The IMB piracy dataset provides a near unique opportunity to examine in a panel setting 
whether the relationship between state weakness and (organised) crime is non-linear. Because 
of the differences in the skills and infrastructure needed to carry out different types of piracy, 
one would expect that different factors would drive the incidence of the various types of 
piracy. The lucrative forms of piracy need stability and infrastructure in combination with 
elites tolerant of piracy or a corrupt bureaucracy. This combination is likely to be relatively 
rare. 
 
 H1: The dataset on maritime crime compiled by the IMB is dominated by (small scale) theft. 
The right conditions for ambitious acts of piracy emerge only rarely. 
 
Piracy which takes the form of armed robbery resulting in minor thefts can occur even 
under conditions of very weak governance as the pirate groups can be small and do not 
necessarily have to sell their booty (cash, stores). However, opportunities for such thefts will 
be few and far between in failed states, as trade volumes collapse and commercial ships avoid 
harbours and coastlines whenever possible. As governance improves, trade increases and with 
it opportunity for theft from ships. Eventually the opportunity effect begins to be outweighed 
by improvements in law enforcement, but petty maritime crime can occur even under 
conditions of relatively good governance.  
 
H2: The relationship between low level acts of piracy and governance is quadratic, first rising 
and then falling as governance is improved. 
 
If control over a territory is violently contested, piracy which requires time for 
completing ransom negotiations or infrastructure to unload cargo and give a ship a new 
identity is not an option. 
 11 
 
rms piracy.  
                                                
H3: Profitable forms of piracy are not associated with anarchy or high level violent conflict. 
 
  Top-end piracy (where large amounts of cargo or entire ships are stolen and sold on) 
needs functioning market structures. It will emerge in conditions where the government 
selectively provides security, a good infrastructure and market access to criminal groups.  
 
H4: Top-end piracy benefits from a combination of high government effectiveness and 
bureaucratic corruption. 
 
Conditions conducive to “high-end” piracy may also be found in what Rabasa et al 
(2007) term “ungoverned territories”
18. Such regions may be quite stable once the 
government has ceded authority to local actors who are able to produce informal governance 
structures
19. If the elites in power are accepting of (and/or participating in the profits from) 
piracy, these regions are likely to be highly conducive to developing lucrative fo
 
H5: Ambitious forms of piracy emerge in countries where there are geographic regions which 
are not controlled by central government and where governance is not violently contested. 
 
Different forms of piracy exist alongside each other. At the micro level petty piracy 
may play a role as a training ground for larger and more ambitious forms of piracy. This 
relates to acquiring skills with weapons and on how to get on board a ship with a high 
freeboard. Countries with a history of (petty) violent maritime crime would be better able to 
take advantage of temporary reductions in government effectiveness to become more 
ambitious in their operations
20.  
 
H6: Different types of piracy co-exist. The existence of petty maritime crime has a positive 
effect on the probability of a country developing more profitable forms of piracy.  
 
 
18 Rabasa et al (2007) look at the related issue of optimal havens for international terrorist activity. They identify 
regions where the central government’s authority is directly challenged (referred to as “contested territories”), 
regions where the government is unable to exercise its authority (“incomplete governance”) and regions where 
the government has actively withdrawn and ceded authority to local actors (“abdicated governance”). 
19 For example Somaliland and Puntland in Somalia.  
20 For example piracy in the Malacca Straits became considerably more frequent ambitious after the Asian crisis 
and the conflict in Aceh.  12 
 
                                                
Occasional, “opportunistic” maritime crime can occur anywhere at any time. However, pirate 
gangs are more likely to establish themselves permanently and organise a higher number of 
attacks in countries with weak governance. Looking at the IMB data we see that a number of 
countries turn up regularly as piracy-prone locations. This is not a surprise: if conditions for 
piracy are good in one year chances are that they will continue to be favourable: the 
geographic indicators are constant over time and improvements in governance tend not to 
happen overnight. On several occasions we observe piracy starting slowly and increasing in 
intensity over time and eventually tailing off – probably as additional resources are invested 
to tackle the problem
21. Conversely, there are some countries where there are occasional 
attacks on boats, but no piracy industry establishes itself as a consequence
22. We hypothesise 
that in “failed states” opportunities arise rarely and in well governed countries detection of 
repeat offenders is likely. 
 
H7: Persistence and intensity of piracy initially increases as governance improves and then 
begins to fall.  
 
Finally, we would expect to find the same result as the established literature on crime and 
governance if we restrict our sample to those countries which have been used in previous 
analyses. 
 
H8: The relationship between maritime crime and governance is negative, statistically 
significant and linear when the countries at the bottom end of the governance are excluded 
from the empirical analysis. 
 
 
3 Model and Data 
3.1 Models of Piracy 
We constructed a panel dataset containing all pirate attacks and their correlates from 
1997 to 2009 for all countries with a coastline. For the operationalization of our models to test 
hypotheses H2-H8, we use the data on different types of piracy events separately, as we 
believe that different local conditions influence the type of piracy conducted in a location.  
 
 
21 Indonesia, South China Sea, India, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Philippines and Vietnam. 
22 E.g. Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Nicaragua, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone,  Taiwan, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Oman, Albania, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Italy, Malta or Turkey.  3.1.1. Probability of Observing Piracy 
Firstly we look at the probability of certain types of pirate activity being reported from 
a location. For this we construct a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a particular 
form of piracy takes place in a country during a particular year. This takes care of a number of 
issues. Firstly, the distribution of piracy events is dominated by country-years without any 
piracy events. Especially high-end piracy is rare - though where it occurs, we often see a large 
number of events. When the conditions are right a single country can produce a high number 
of attacks. Therefore the variable distribution is not in the classic shape of (even zero-inflated) 
count data. Secondly, piracy has a risk of being underreported. Shipping companies 
sometimes prefer not to report a pirate attack, because it is thought to reflect badly on them 
(Murphy 2007). Additionally, reporting incidents of successful boarding can lead to lengthy 
forensic investigations confining ships to harbor (Chalk 2009). Finally, ship-owners may not 
want to alert insurance companies to an emerging piracy hotspot (which could be justify a 
hike in insurance cost) and instead cover minor expenses arising from pirate attacks 
themselves
23.  However, if piracy occurs in any significant quantity, there is likely to be at 
least one ship-owner who will report it
24.  
 
Combining all factors in a logit model results in a regression that looks as follows: 












  0 it it i t it Xw          
 
in which  it piracy  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an act of piracy takes place in 
country i during year t and  it X  is the set of variables that we use to explain the occurrence of 
piracy, which are discussed below.  i   and   are the random effects associated with group 
and time features and have an expected value of 0. Finally, 
t w




                                                 
23 See for example (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-07-03-nigeria-privacy_N.htm) 
13 
 
24 In all regressions we tried a variable measuring the geographical distance of the capital of the country from 
which the attack is reported to Kuala Lumpur, where the dataset is compiled. It is excluded from the reported 
results if it was not significant.  3.1.2. Intensity of Piracy 
Despite our reservations about whether intensity is accurately reported (as discussed 
above) we also investigate the factors determining the intensity of piracy. Although the 
intensity variables are counts of different types of incidents occurring each year, they do not 
follow the traditional distribution associated with count data, e.g. the Poisson distribution or a 
variant thereof. Firstly, the dataset is dominated by zero observations – i.e. about half of the 
countries do not ever report any maritime crime and many more only see piracy occasionally. 
Secondly, when the conditions are very favourable for carrying out acts of maritime crime, a 
large number of acts are reported. Examples are Nigeria in 2007 with 42 incidents, 
Bangladesh in 2006 with 46 incidents, Indonesia in 2005 with 79 incidents (plus 12 in the 
Malacca Straits) and Somalia in 2009 with 211 incidents (including Gulf of Aden and the Red 
Sea) (IMB, 2009). To avoid the few locations with large observations dominating the results, 
we use a log transform of the intensity variable (ln(1 ) it piracy  ) and used a panel Tobit 
regression
25. This assumes that there is a linear relationship between the independent 
variables in Xit and an unobserved (latent) variable y
*
it.  We only observe y
*
it (in this case 
ln(1 ) it piracy  ) if y
*














    
 where 
*
0 it it i t it yX w          
 
We were only able to get stable coefficients for small-scale maritime crime
26. Below we 
report the results for two samples: the complete sample (i.e. all countries with coastlines, 
where non-zero observations make up about 20% of total observations) and a sample of all 
countries in which at least one act of piracy was reported during the period (here non-zero 
observations make up just under 40% of total observations). 
  
3.1.3 Persistence of Piracy 
Whether or not piracy manages to thrive over time is likely to be dependent on the 
institutional environment: where governance is highly effective we would expect piracy to be 
tackled quickly. In anarchic states opportunities for piracy arise infrequently and the booty 
                                                 
25 An ordered random effects logit or probit for zero, occasional, low intensity and high intensity piracy would 
be a good alternative, but has not been coded for panels in Stata 11.  
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26 Top-end piracy is extremely rare and the results are obviously dominated by Somalia and Indonesia. could be contested or difficult to sell, lowering the gains from piracy. Countries which 
function relatively well but have corrupt bureaucrats would be most likely to produce 
persistent piracy. We therefore estimate a series of dynamic models with a lagged dependent 
variable, as well as interaction terms between the lagged (dummy) variable with quality of 
governance.  
 
3.1.4 Sample Selection  
  We suspect that the non-linear interactions between governance and piracy are 
applicable to a much wider range of criminal activities. However, the pattern will only be seen 
when countries at the bottom end of the governance spectrum are included in the sample. As 
we cannot restore these missing observations to the previous studies, we re-run some of 
models excluding the very badly governed countries instead. We show that beyond a certain 
cut-off our result breaks down and the established result of the governance literature is 
convincingly resurrected.  
 
3.1.5 Explanatory Variables 
The main variables of interest in  it X  are three aspects of governance. Firstly, the 
quality of various aspects of governance as measured by the indicators constructed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) for the World Bank
27. Secondly, the intensity of violent conflict in a 
country and whether or not a country is considered a “failed state”. Thirdly we consider drugs 
exports of a country as an indicator of the possible existence of “ungoverned territories” 
where organised crime has replaced the government as the main provider of public goods and 
security and perhaps already has maritime experience through the export of drugs
28.  
We then include a number of control variables to capture opportunities for pirate 
activity. As our dataset is dominated by attacks on stationary ships we include the number of 
deep water ports as a proxy for a country’s maritime tradition and its participation in world 
trade. Secondly, we construct a proxy for the number of ships in the anchorages outside these 
ports. Finally we include a dummy for countries which are exporting oil, as this would 
generate shipping traffic pretty much regardless of the dangers associated with its territorial 
waters
29.  
                                                 
27 The reported results are based on data from 1997 (or 1998) to 2008 
28  Data on homicide rates are not widely enough reported (especially at the bottom of the governance spectrum) 
to be usable as a proxy for violent crime within a country. 
15 
 
29 This was not significant and is not included in the results reported below.  16 
 
                                                
For attacks on moving ships we were unable to access data on the intensity of shipping 
traffic on the various trade routes. Instead we use a dummy for countries bordering the areas 
commonly described as “choke points” or “strategic passages” for shipping traffic
30: As 
regards capturing the effect of poverty as a “motive” for piracy we use the indicator of 




3.2 Estimation method 
We use random effects in our estimation, because of the characteristics of the data. In 
several countries piracy is endemic, while others never report piracy at all. Employing fixed 
effects reduces the sample by about two-thirds, with most of the interesting observations 
dropping out. Additionally, fixed effects are unlikely to be informative because the levels of 
governance do not change much over the thirteen-year period of data. Of all our observations, 
government effectiveness and control for corruption change by more than one standard 
deviation in only eight and ten countries respectively
32. Of this total of sixteen countries, only 
eight would still be included in our regressions, after dropping all countries where there is no 
variation in the occurrence of piracy. 
All reported results were calculated in Stata 11. Slight differences in the estimation 
results can occur depending on the version of Stata used, the starting estimates and number of 
quadrature points used by the programme
33. Using the “quadchk” routine we find that in the 
regressions there may be relative differences in the estimated coefficients of up to 1%. To 







30 See for example Kaluza et al (2010) and Rodrigue (2004). These passages are particularly relevant for 
shipments of oil.  
31 As GDP per capita is highly correlated with quality of governance indicators, multicollinearity may occur. 
Where we found GDP per capita to be significant, we report the results both with and without this variable to 
show that the statistical relationship for the governance variables is not spurious. 
32 Government Effectiveness worsened in Cote d’Ivoire, North Korea, the Comoros, Mauritania and Eritrea. It 
improved in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Malta and Dominica. Control on Corruption worsened in Guinea, 
Cote d’Ivoire, North Korea, Gambia and Trinidad & Tobago, while it improved in the Bahamas, Georgia, United 
Arab Emirates, Liberia and Qatar. 
33 The main result on the effect of governance on piracy is robust to the version of Stata and the number of 
quadrature points used.  17 
 
                                                
3.3 Data 
The dependent variable in this analysis is based on the maritime piracy database 
published annually by the International Maritime Bureau (from 1997 to 2009). The IMB 
provides narratives on all incidents of piracy reported (voluntarily) by captains and ship-
owners as well as annual counts of incidents of piracy for each country. However, the IMB’s 
reporting choices at the aggregate level are not optimal for our analysis.  
Firstly, the IMB distinguish between “successful” and “unsuccessful” attacks, where 
successful attacks include incidents where pirates managed to get on board a ship. A 
significant percentage of this group, however, includes cases in which nobody is hurt and 
during which nothing is stolen. In an economic sense, such cases would not be classified as 
“successful”. Secondly, the aggregation of “successful” attacks into “boarded”, “detained” 
and “hijacked” does not do justice to the wealth of data available in the individual narratives. 
Finally, the IMB is not entirely consistent in its decisions regarding aggregation
34. 
We have therefore analysed each individual narrative in the IMB Annual Piracy 
Reports between 1997 and 2009 and recoded them as follows. Within the “successful” 
category, we divide the individual observations between petty theft, major theft, hijacking for 
ransom, stealing a small or a big vessel (with cargo), taking people hostage and “other”
  35. 
Within each category, we also know how many attacks were successful in an economic sense 
and how many were not.  
The “unsuccessful” IMB category consists of piracy attempts that failed entirely, 
coded by the IMB as “fired upon” and “attempted”. As it is unobservable what the intent was 
of the would-be attackers, we divide this category between stationary and non-stationary 
attacks. This acknowledges the fact that an attack on a moving vessel is more ambitious and 
associated with a higher level of sophistication than an attack on a stationary one. The non-
stationary failed attempts of piracy are the only category that have increased strongly over 
time, increasing from 7 per cent of all attacks in 1997 (55 per cent of failed attacks) to 45 per 
cent of all attacks in 2009 (91 per cent of failed attacks). Table 1 contains a summary of all 
the piracy events, distributed over all the different categories
36.  
 
34 Some attacks on fishing fleets are reported as separate attacks on each ship, while others are reported as a 
single incident. Our database records the number of ships successfully attacked. This is irrelevant in the 
estimations which consider a dummy variable of whether or not piracy takes place, but it could matter in the 
regressions of the intensity of piracy.  
35The “other” category mostly consists of harassment by officials and what appear to be mutinies. We do not 
make use of this category at all here. 
36 A number of the observations in the IMB database take place either in international waters or in straits 
bordered by two or several different countries. We deal with this as follows: Events in the Gulf of Aden (270 
cases of any kind of piracy, whether successful or failed), the Red Sea (42 cases), the Arabian Sea (10 cases), the 18 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Diagram 3 shows how successful attacks are distributed over the different types of 
piracy. We have clear support for our hypothesis H1: most of the reported acts of successful 
piracy as reported by the IMB are of the small scale theft type, which can occur under any 
form of governance. Its share of all piracy events varies between 72 (in 2008) and 93 per cent 
(2000). High-end piracy is relatively rare and as expected the rarest form of piracy is the 
major theft type, which needs the combination of good infrastructure and pervasive 
corruption.  
 
The exogenous variable of interest is governance. For this, we use the Kaufmann et al. 
(2009) variables related to corruption and government effectiveness
37. While the “rule of law” 
index
38 captures the phenomenon we seek to cover most closely, it is partially based on 
country expert’s opinions of the pervasiveness of crime. The occurrence of piracy may 
influence expert opinions on the overall quality of law and we have therefore not used this 
variable. Kaufmann et al. (2009) report estimates for these variables for each country from 
1996 to 2008
39.  While they specifically point out that the values of these variables are 
normalized annually and are thus not originally intended to be used as panel data, Kaufmann 
(2004) shows that it is actually feasible to do so. In addition to the level of governance, we 
also include a dummy indicating whether a country in a particular year is considered to suffer 
from state failure. We define state failure using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2010), 
which gives an error value of -77 for country-years where the situation is so chaotic that it is 
impossible to judge institutional quality. 
 
Indian Ocean (4 cases) and the Gulf of Oman (1 case) are commonly accepted to have been carried out by 
Somali pirates. Similarly events in the Malacca (220 cases) and Singapore Straits (78 cases) are attributed to 
Indonesia. 2 events in 2003 in the Caribbean Sea are most likely to have originated in Trinidad and Tobago and 1 
event in 2004 in the Pacific Ocean is most likely to have been carried out by Colombian pirates. We have not 
been able to come up with a clear attribution of piracy events in the South China Sea and have therefore not 
allocated these events to any country. However, the littoral states (China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Indonesia) all feature as originators of piracy in various years in the database regardless. Therefore only the 
intensity variable is affected by this omission.  
37Control of Corruption (CC) – measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests” 
Government Effectiveness (GE) – measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies 
38 Rule of Law (RL) – measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence 
39 For the years 1997 and 1999, Kaufmann et al. unfortunately do not report any data. In order to be able to use 
these years nonetheless, we chose to interpolate the missing years from the reported data. Knowing that the 
quality of governance does not change very quickly and recognizing that we are mostly interested in major 
differences in the quality of governance, we believe this is safe. 19 
 
                                                
The second governance-related variable is the occurrence of conflict. This may 
indicate that the governance score reported by Kaufmann is not uniformly applicable across 
the country, because some regions are not governed by the central authority.  For this, we use 
the MEPV dataset (Marshall and Cole, 2010), which reports on political violence in all 
countries in the world. This database is particularly useful for our purpose, because it reports 
the magnitude of societal impact of civil or ethnic violence in each year varying from 1 
(sporadic political violence) to 10 (extermination and annihilation)
 40. We look at the effect of 
different levels of conflict; the idea being that intense contest over territory is not helpful for 
pirates, while abdicated governance and low level violence may well aid piracy
41.  
Thirdly, we look at the effect of the presence of organized crime on piracy. For this, 
we use the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (1997 to 2010), in which 
the American government discusses the international drug trade. Conveniently, each year the 
report identifies a list of countries that significantly contribute to the production or 
distribution of non-synthetic prohibited drugs. We create a dummy variable of whether or not 
a country is included on this list in a specific year
42.   
To capture opportunity and “maritime tradition” we use the number of deep ports per 
country, defined as ports large enough for ships that adhere to the new Panamax standard 
(World Shipping Register, 2010)
43. Secondly, we include is a dummy of whether or not a 
country borders one of the following choke points: the Suez Canal and Bab-el-Mandeb, the 
Panama Canal, the Malacca Straits, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bosphorus (Rodrigue, 
2004)
44. Each of these passages can only circumvented at great economic cost, whereas 
otherwise it is generally possible to give the coastline of a failed state a wide berth. The 
presence of a choke point therefore increases the opportunity for piracy
45.  
The final variable that is a good indicator of opportunity is related to the observation 
that much of maritime crime takes place in anchorages. Here ships often only have a skeleton 
crew on board, making it easier for criminals to come on board undetected and overwhelm the 
 
40 Within the time period that we are looking at, the maximum level of conflict intensity is 7. 
41 Both because abdicated governance can result in pirate havens and conflict means easy access to weapons. 
42 We only include countries producing non-synthetic drugs. We also considered the possibility of using the 
presence or size of counternarcotics aid provided by the US government as an indicator for drug production, but 
as counter-narcotics aid is used as a political tool, there is a very strong correlation between distance from the 
US and the likelihood of receiving such aid. For the other drugs variable, this correlation is much less strong. 
43 Benítez (2009) defines the New Panamax standard as a draft of maximum 15.2 meters. This is the size with 
which ships will be able to use the Panama Canal after the expansion of the Panama Canal is completed in 2014. 
44 Somalia is judged to benefit from the Bab‐el‐Mandeb choke point despite not technically bordering it.   
45 Another opportunity-related variable we tried was a dummy variable indicating whether a country is an oil 
exporter as this would generate shipping traffic regardless of local conditions. However, this was not significant 
in any regressions specification and is omitted from the reported results.  sailors
 46. Unfortunately, it has not been possible for us to gather information about the use of 
anchorages over time, so instead we construct an instrument that should capture how busy 
anchorages are. Anchorages are generally associated with ports, giving ships a cheap place to 
wait until cargo becomes available or a new charter is agreed. Ships are more likely to use 
anchorages when supply of shipping services outstrips demand and not all ships can be 
operated profitably. Our proxy for the number of ships in anchorages in a given country year 
is therefore constructed as follows:  First, we use the number of deep ports per country. 
Second, we employ the annual midpoint of the Baltic Dry Index (Baltic Exchange, 2010). 
This index measures the cost of shipping and it is particularly interesting for us, as it gives 
information about the equilibrium between supply and demand for shipping services. The 
index responds both to changes in the global economy when this affects trade, but also to the 
supply of ships. Both of these may affect the number of ships laid-up at anchorage. Finally, 
we expect that ship owners are sensitive to the fees levied by port authorities for being 
allowed to anchor a ship for some time. Prime example is Chittagong, which is considered to 
be among the cheapest ports in terms of anchorage fees and is thus a prime destination for it. 
However, as we have no information about these fees, we believe that GDP per capita (from 
Heston et al. 2009) is a reasonable indicator for the order of magnitude of these fees. In order 
to construct our anchorage instrument, we combine these elements as follows:  
 
 
,, */ it t i it anchorage BDI ports GDP   
 
Table 2 contains a summary of the descriptive statistics of all the variables we use in 
the analysis. We also assign a category to each of the control variables, to see whether this 
variable relates to a motive to commit acts of piracy, the means to be able to commit or 
whether it affects the opportunity to do so.  Most of the reported acts of (high end) piracy 
arise from a small number of locations (Bangladesh / Somalia / Indonesia). The dummy 
variables therefore show that the right conditions for piracy arise very rarely, while the 
intensity variables show that if conditions are good a lot of piracy operations may be 
conducted. The anchorage variable in itself does not have any meaning as this is the value of 
the instrument we construct. Table 3 summarizes all the sources employed in this paper. 
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46 The “anchor watch” for a large cargo ship may only be three to five people 21 
 
                                                
4. Results 
4.1 Small-scale Maritime Crime 
We split up the sample broadly into petty maritime crime on the one hand and lucrative forms 
of piracy on the other. Table 2 reports the results for small scale maritime crime. The three 
dependent variables are dummies of whether the following types of attack occurred at least 
once during the year 1) successful small scale theft, 2) successful and unsuccessful small scale 
theft and 3) all attacks on stationary ships, regardless of whether or not they were successful. 
We observe the expected quadratic effect in governance quality: initially, as governance 
improves, so does the probability of armed theft from ships. However, as governance 
improves beyond this optimal point, the likelihood of petty maritime crime decreases. It does 
not greatly matter whether we use government effectiveness or control of corruption as our 
proxy for the quality of governance, but government effectiveness is more consistently highly 
significant
47. We therefore have strong evidence in favour of hypothesis H2.  
In addition we have two other factors which increase the probability of maritime 
crime: 1) the existence of low level civil conflict, which undermines the quality of governance 
at least locally and raises the amount of weapons in a country, and 2) an acknowledged 
problem with drug production and distribution, which means that (armed) criminal gangs are 
already organised in the country. However, the drug dummy is not robustly significant across 
regression specifications. The small-scale piracy dummy also appears to be linked to poverty, 
in that the lnGDP per capita variable is highly significant (in addition to the governance 
variables). Foreign ships are a tempting target in poor countries. The final factor of relevance 
is the opportunity arising from ships berthed in harbours. Interestingly here we have another 
quadratic effect: deep sea ports create opportunities, but countries with a strong maritime 
tradition (and hence several deep sea ports) appear to invest in effective deterrents against 
piracy
48. The optimal arrangement for pirates appears to be if all of a country’s shipping 
traffic is concentrated in a few and hence congested ports with busy anchorages.  
  
4.2 High-end Piracy 
For the more lucrative forms of piracy we look at the different types of attacks 
separately. The results are presented in tables 3 and 4. The most ambitious type of piracy is 
the theft of entire ships and / or major amounts of cargo. This is the turning point on the curve 
pictured in figure 1 and while the quadratic effect in governance is preserved in the 
 
47 The Rule of Law indicator provides the best fit, but as piracy itself may feed into expert evaluation of how 
effective the government’s control of crime is we have not reported it here. 
48 When we control for GDP per capita this effect disappears, however. 22 
 
                                                
coefficients, it is (as would be expected) no longer significant. Instead we observe a very 
interesting interaction between two aspects of quality of governance (models 4 and 5). Piracy 
increases in government effectiveness which measures (among other things) the quality of 
public goods provision. This would include infrastructure, such as the port and dock facilities 
pirates need to unload the cargo and give a ship a new identity. On the other hand there is a 
strong negative effect on piracy as the government increases its control of corruption. 
Therefore we have very good evidence in favour of H4. As expected, the econometrically 
preferred regression equation does not include state failure as an explanatory variable, 
confirming hypothesis H3
49. Finally we have evidence for Hypothesis H6 in that the existence 
of petty forms of maritime crime increases the likelihood of more ambitious forms of piracy 
occurring. Among the control variables we find evidence for the importance of opportunities 
for piracy again: here they are the choke points where shipping is concentrated and ships slow 
down for easy target selection and anchorages where ships lie idle and are not well guarded. 
Log of GDP per capita (as an indicator of poverty as a motive) is not significant alongside the 
governance variables (which maintain significance in specifications which include GDP per 
capita). We interpret this as an indicator that high-end piracy is organised crime and not 
driven by extreme poverty.  
 
Model 6b shows similar results for the governance effects are obtained for the hostage taking 
form of piracy (on either side of the maximum point in figure 1): Both corruption and a 
reasonable level of government effectiveness are helpful for this form of piracy. Pirates need 
stability to keep their hostages safe from other groups while negotiating ransoms – if this 
security can be provided by corrupt government officials so much the better. However, model 
6a indicates that this result is not completely robust: when we control for geographical 
distance from Kuala Lumpur the government effectiveness variable loses significance and 
distance from Kuala Lumpur takes on significance instead. Ship-owners outside Asia (where 
relations with the IMB reporting centre might be particularly good) might not report missing 
crew if the problem is quickly and cheaply resolved by paying a ransom. Therefore this 
governance result should be interpreted with caution here. However, hide-outs in areas neither 
well controlled nor actively contested by government as indicated by the (robust) significance 
of the low level ethnic conflict dummy. Busy anchorages provide opportunities for this form 
 
49 Statefailure is at the border of significance if Somalia is included in the sample but not at all significant if 
Somalia is excluded. Please see discussion below. 23 
 
                                                
of piracy. Again there is no evidence for a “poverty motive” from the GDP per capita 
variable.  
 
The main governance variable determining the probability of hijacking of ships and 
their ransom without theft of cargo is low level violent conflict. This indicates the importance 
of the existence of “ungoverned territories” for anchoring ships while ransoms are being 
negotiated. While there appear to be benefits from corruption in specifications (7 and 8), these 
disappear if we control both for Somalia as a special case and for the existence of petty forms 
of piracy which are in themselves linked to institutional weakness (model 9). Again we have 
evidence that this type of piracy develops from petty forms of piracy when the conditions are 
right. This fits in well with explanations of Somali piracy which focus on Somali fishermen 
initially stealing from ships illegally fishing or dumping toxic waste in Somali waters and 
eventually moving on to extortion and large-scale hijack and ransom. There are no GDP per 
capita effects indicating that these pirates are not the opportunistic poor but relatively well 
resourced.  
11 of the 45 positive observations of this variable are generated by Somalia and the 
Somalia dummy is highly significant
50. However, the state failure variable was not significant 
in this model regardless of whether we controlled for Somalia. We therefore argue that the 
“anarchy” or “failed state” explanation of Somali piracy is not helpful. Somalia has only 
“failed” in the narrow sense in that the international community’s preferred form of Somalia 
as a unitary state governed from Mogadishu is not viable. However, Somaliland is reasonably 
well governed (Walls, 2009) and Puntland provides sufficient stability at least for reasonably 
lucrative piracy. In fact, the Puntland set-up where pirates conduct their business while local 
elites (openly or secretly) participate in the gains most closely resembles the conditions of the 
historical swashbuckling accounts of piracy – except that (fortunately) 17
th century style port 
facilities are not conducive to stealing cargo and giving ships a new identity for resale, hence 
the focus on ransoms.  
 
4.3 Intensity of Piracy 
Table 7 summarises the results on the intensity of (small-scale) maritime crime. We 
get a robust result that at the bottom end of the governance spectrum criminals benefit from 
improvements in security, stability and public services and reductions in predatory (corrupt) 
 
50 For 2004 we have one successful hostage taking, one theft and several unsuccessful attempts on steaming 
ships – i.e. no successful hijack and ransom observation.  24 
 
                                                
state behaviour. As governance improves further, the incidents of theft from ships begin to 
fall. This main result does not greatly depend on the sample or the definition of governance 
(we see very little difference between the a) and b) versions of the models). Once again we 
confirm the importance of opportunity (ports and busy anchorages give easy access to targets) 
and poverty as a motive for stealing from ships (the number of incidents is reduced as GDP 
per capita increases). The intensity regressions therefore confirm the results from the 
probability regressions.  
 
4.4 Dynamics of Piracy 
Table 8 includes a lagged dependent variable into both the small-scale and large-scale 
piracy logit regressions to investigate the persistence of piracy. In all models either the lagged 
dependent variable, or in the case of model 15 a related lagged piracy variable are highly 
significant. In model 13a we additionally see that the persistence of small-scale piracy 
depends on the institutional quality in the country. The interaction terms between lagged low 
level piracy and the governance variables are highly significant. Persistence becomes more 
likely with increasing governance initially and then decreases with better governance – i.e. we 
see occasional opportunistic piracy in high and very low governance countries and regular 
piracy in the middle. This clearly confirms hypothesis H7.The raw governance variables are 
no longer significant in this model (13b). 
For attacks on moving ships (model 14) we also see persistence over time (as well as a 
positive effect from current or lagged low level piracy). Successful major theft (model 15) 
seems to be more strongly associated with low level piracy in the past (the “school of piracy” 
explanation) than with its own lagged value. In both cases the result for the raw institutional 
data remains intact and the interaction terms are not significant. Possibly, top end piracy is too 
rare for these interactions to become statistically significant. The message remains therefore 
that the combination of effective public provision alongside deep corruption furthers top end 
piracy - with additional benefits from learning about boarding ships for the purpose of theft 
and having handled significant booty in the past
51.  
  
4.5 Sample Selection 
  The strength of our previous results initially improves when we exclude observations 
from the very bottom of the governance spectrum. This is because we are discarding an 
 
51 The improved log-likelihood indicates that this regression specification is in fact econometrically preferred to 
equation 5. 25 
 
                                                
obvious outlier - Somalia - which produces persistent and intense piracy despite its low 
governance score. As expected, table 9 shows that once we increase the government 
effectiveness threshold for excluding countries above -0.7 our result breaks down and the 
quadratic term is no longer significant
52. Instead the previous result of a negative, linear 
relationship is once again highly significant, confirming hypothesis H8. We therefore 
conclude that one should be extremely careful about generalising the effects of governance 
obtained in the medium to high governance range to countries at the bottom of the governance 
spectrum. 
 
4.6 Summary and Interpretation 
  The results show a clear non-linear relationship between governance and the 
probability, intensity and persistence of (maritime) crime. Looking at the coefficients, the 
models predict that optimal conditions for petty maritime criminals exist in countries where 
the government effectiveness score is in the region between -0.9 and -0.5 and the corruption 
score between -1.3 and -0.9.  Countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Cameroon are exactly 
in this range, while countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, North Korea 
and Sierra Leone are “too dysfunctional” for a thriving piracy business – at the moment! 
Institution-building measures in Indonesia are reflected in the considerable improvements in 
Indonesia’s governance scores, moving pirates from being right in the “sweet spot” up until 
2003 to well beyond it by 2008. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that the effect of governance on 
criminal activity is non-linear: criminals and especially organised crime benefit from 
functioning market and state structures at least to some extent. This is because criminal and 
legal business activities are similar in the way they are conducted and legal business ventures 
are often an integral part of successful organised crime. The result is highly intuitive and 
perfectly in line with sociological research on criminal organisations. The piracy dataset 
compiled by the IMB collects its data from the victims of various forms of maritime crime 
rather than from governments and police authorities and provides a unique picture of crime in 
countries which are too dysfunctional to provide sufficient data to be included in previous 
studies of the economics of crime.  
 
52 At this point we are excluding a number of countries from the regression which are generally missing from 
econometric analyses, such as Angola, Cambodia, the Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Vietnam and Yemen. 26 
 
Specifically, we were able to show that even low level maritime crime benefits from 
improvements in governance for some parts of the governance spectrum as opportunities for 
theft and enjoying the fruits of crime improve. In weakly governed countries, piracy can 
become endemic, while in ungoverned, failed states and well governed countries piracy 
occurs only very occasionally. Overall a quadratic specification fits the relationship between 
governance and petty maritime crime best.  
For piracy businesses at the top of the spectrum (and by extension other forms of 
lucrative organised crime) we showed that optimal conditions arise when corrupt elites or 
bureaucracies are able to provide selective access to excellent physical infrastructures and 
thriving markets in return for bribes. Given that the various aspects of institutional quality 
tend to be highly correlated, such conditions arise only rarely. They can occur when a sudden 
deterioration in economic performance or political stability undermines discipline and 
commitment in the civil service, as was demonstrated in Indonesia after the Asian crisis. 
Lastly, we were able to provide evidence that the Kaufmann governance indicators, 
which provide a broad picture of institutional quality at the national level, may not adequately 
capture “pockets of lawlessness” within countries. When criminal or insurgent / dissident 
groups control coastal areas we may well see them developing a piracy branch to increase the 
profitability of their operations. 
We cannot be sure that our results on the effect of governance on maritime crime can 
be generalised to other forms of crime. However, the current problems of rich European 
countries with organised criminal gangs from Eastern Europe and Asia suggests that well 
developed markets and infrastructures are more attractive to these criminals than the 
conditions in their poor and unstable home countries. The Italian Mafia thrives in an 
environment where government effectiveness and corruption exist alongside one another: 
precisely the conditions our models suggest helps sophisticated organised criminal gangs. 
What our result does show clearly, is that the established result of a negative, linear 
relationship obtained by analysing (mostly or exclusively) reasonably well governed countries 
does not necessarily apply to countries at the bottom of the governance spectrum. Criminality 
might increase as markets create new opportunities and can become endemic unless 
bureaucrats are incentivised to tackle rather than tolerate or protect criminal organisations. 
This insight needs to be factored into policy advice to countries emerging from state failure.  
 
Regarding policy advice for combating piracy, the result that the effect of governance 
is non-linear is critical. For land-based approaches to resolving piracy to become effective 27 
 
governance structures need to be strengthened beyond the point where the improvements 
provide a net gain to pirates. The focus of such approaches needs to be on eliminating 
corruption and targeting (political and criminal) groups tolerant of piracy which control 
coastal territories. Our explanation for the successful reduction in pirate activity in the 
Malacca Straits is that the conditions for pirates were optimal in the turmoil after the Asian 
crisis and during the conflict in Aceh. Therefore a subsequent improvement of institutional 
quality had the desired effect of moving pirates “down the curve” in figure 1 to the right of its 
turning point. However, the continued existence of petty maritime crime in the region 
suggests that pirates are to some extent biding their time: top-end piracy can re-emerge as 
soon as the political or economic situation in Indonesia deteriorates and bureaucrats once 
again look for bribes to supplement incomes. For piracy in Nigeria the results suggest that if 
the “Mend” group succeeds in creating an autonomous region which is no longer contested by 
the Nigerian government piracy will increase and more lucrative forms of piracy will be 
developed.  
The Somalia problem has very deep roots. More violent contest over who provides 
governance in Puntland would probably reduce piracy in the region. A peaceful settlement, 
however, where Puntland is given greater independence (with resulting improvements in 
political stability and physical infrastructure) could move pirates even further into their 
“sweet spot”. If Puntland’s elites could be convinced by the international community to 
become less tolerant of openly conducted hijack and ransom piracy, the most likely initial 
outcome would be a change in pirates’ tactics to hostage-taking and jettisoning the ships.  
Finally, piracy is likely to remain a problem in the long term, as countries where 
opportunities for piracy exist emerge from state failure and start to develop markets and 
infrastructure. Such improvements combined with corruption or semi-autonomous regions 
could lead to the development of pirate activity until institutional quality becomes sufficiently 
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Diagram 3: Different types of economically successful piracy 
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 Table 1. Summary statistics for all piracy events 
 
 Successful  piracy  Unsuccessful 






Hostage Other  Stationary  Non-
stationary 
1997  168  2 7 3 2 23  13  16 
1998  135  3 5 13  1 4 8 28 
1999  222  1 6 7 2 2 16  45 
2000  297  3 5 1 2 10  44  109 
2001  219  2 18  69  3 1 31  69 
2002  245  6 18  7 6 2 42  44 
2003  307  4 18  3 15  4 25  89 
2004  210  2 14  2 21  3 32  61 
2005  171  3 8 13  6 1 14  63 
2006  155  1 6 3 7 4 23  40 
2007  156  6 7 13  9 0 94  26 
2008  145  1 14  34  5 2 11  82 




 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of all variables used 
Variable Control  type  N  Mean  St.Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dummy  variables         
Successful minor theft   1976  0.177  0.381  0 1 
Minor theft   1976  0.199  0.400  0 1 
Minor theft + attacks on stationary ships   1976  0.209  0.406  0 1 
Big ships and major theft   1976  0.020  0.141  0 1 
Big and small ships and major theft    1976  0.031  0.173  0 1 
Hostage-taking   1976  0.008  0.087  0 1 
Hijack and Ransom   1976  0.023  0.149  0 1 
Intensity variables         
Successful minor theft   1976  1.282  6.334  0  124 
Minor theft + Attack on stationary ships   1976  1.469  7.251  0  140 
Controls         
ln(gdp per capita)  motive 1787  8.920  1.144  5.733  11.388 
State failure  means 1976  0.016  0.126  0  1 
Civil (2)  means 1972  0.010  0.100  0  1 
Low conflict  means + motive  1976  0.081  0.273  0  1 
Deep ports  opportunity 1976  1.822  3.477  0  28 
Anchorage  opportunity 1787  0.670  1.883  0  24.154 
Choke  opportunity 1976  0.085  0.279  0  1 
Drug exports  means 1976  0.124  0.330  0  1 
Corruption (WB cce+4)  opportunity/means 1728 4.022 1.000 1.984 6.625 
Government effectiveness (WB gee+4)  means  1756 4.023 0.996 1.489 6.531 






Table 3 Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable Source  Definition 
Dummy  variables    
Successful minor theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual theft of small amount of goods, defined (approximately) as the 
amount the pirate(s) are able to carry by themselves 
Minor theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods 
Minor theft + Attack on stationary ships  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Actual and attempted theft of small amount of goods + attacks on ships 
that are stationary (berthed or anchored) 
Big ships and major theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Theft of large ships (trawler or greater) + theft of large amount of goods 
Big and small ships and major theft   International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Theft of large ships + theft of small ships + theft of large amount of 
goods 
Hostage-taking  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Piracy cases where individuals are held for ransom, but the ship is not 
Hijack and Ransom  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Piracy cases where both ship and crew are held for ransom 
Intensity variables    
Successful minor theft  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Number of cases of actual theft of small goods 
Minor theft + Attack on stationary ships  International Maritime Bureau Annual Report  Number of cases of actual theft of small goods + attacks on ships that are 
stationary 
Controls    
ln(gdp per capita)  Penn World Tables  log of GDP per capita (in 2006$) 
State failure  Polity IV Project  Dummy variable that takes value 1 if Polity IV reports -77 
Civil (2)  Major Episodes of Political Violence  Country-years where a civil conflict of intensity 2 takes place 
Low conflict  Major Episodes of Political Violence  Low level civil or ethnic conflict dummy: 
 0< MEPV score<4 
Deep ports  World Shipping Register  Number of ports with a draft equal to the New Panamax standard (15.2 
meters) 
Anchorage  Baltic Dry Index, World Shipping Register and Penn 
World Table 
Indicator for anchorage, as defined in the text 
Choke  Kaluza et al (2010) and Rodrigue (2004)  Choke points for tanker and container traffic 
Drug exports  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report  Dummy for countries mentioned as significant non-synthetic drug 
producers 
Corruption (WB cce+4)  Kaufmann et al. (2010)  Extent to which power is exercised for private gain 
Government effectiveness (gee+4)  Kaufmann et al. (2010)  Quality of civil service 
ln(Kuala Lumpur)  self-collected   log of the distance between a country’s capital and Kuala Lumpur Table 4: Small-scale Maritime Crime 
Model  1a 1b  2a  2b  3a 3b 
















Constant  -6.914*  0.070  -6.376**    2.025     -6.494**     2.062    
  (3.602)  (4.188)      (2.822)  (3.577)      (2.834)      (3.598)     
Corruption Control  3.126*  3.223*           
  (1.869)  (1.906)              
(Corruption Control)
2  -0.602**  -0.541**           
  (0.243)  (0.247)            
Govt effectiveness     2.855*    2.917**     2.972**     3.114**   
      (1.467)      (1.487)      (1.475)       (1.502)     
Gov-eff-sq     -0.549***     -0.460**    -0.567***    -0.483**   
      (0.193)     (0.194)      (0.195)      (0.196)    
LnGDP Per capita    -0.975***      -1.168***      -1.215***  
    (0.319)       (0.335)        (0.336)    
Civil Conflict (2)  2.302**  2.108**    3.181**     2.780**     3.126**     2.726**   
  (1.079)  (1.041)      (1.406)      (1.294)      (1.406)       (1.293)     
Drug exports  1.057*  0.952     0.867     0.728     1.242**    1.070*    
  (0.566)  (0.599)      (0.606)      (0.630)      (0.620)       (0.641)     
Deep Ports  0.757***  0.961***    0.790***    1.005***    0.799***     1.041***   
  (0.227)  (0.309)      (0.259)      (0.311)      (0.272)       (0.316)     
Deep-ports-sq  -0.031*  -0.044     -0.035     -0.049*     -0.036     -0.053*   
  (0.019)  (0.029)     (0.023)      (0.029)      (0.024)      (0.029)    
Log-likelihood  -469.672  -458.891  -509.542  -495.069      -517.462     -499.992 
N  1728  1694  1756  1722  1756  1722 
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 Table 5 Top end Piracy 
Model  4  5 
Dependent:  big vessel and 
major cargo 
theft 
vessel and major 
cargo theft 
Constant  -2.214*      -3.846***    
  (1.227)      (1.064)     
Corruption Control  -2.396***     -1.906***   
  (0.765)      (0.586)     
Govt effectiveness  1.491**   1.550***    
  (0.625)       (0.586)      
Choke Point  1.879***    2.125***    
  (0.459)       (0.476)      
Anchorage  0.164***     0.171***    
  (0.048)       (0.052)      
Petty Piracy  1.606***     1.413***    
  (0.469)       (0.437)      
Log-likelihood  -127.480  -174.875 
N  1694  1694 
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 Table 6 Hostages and Hijack and Ransom 















Constant  19.249**     -4.490  -3.299**    -2.978*     -4.508***   
  (8.981)       (3.721)  (1.399)      (1.556)      (1.435)    
Corruption  -7.593**     -6.451***  -0.647*     -0.895**     -0.360    
  (3.110)      (2.275)  (0.364)      (0.400)      (0.358)    
Govt effectiveness  3.696     5.182***      
  (2.390)       (1.988)       
Ethnic Conf (1)  1.999**    2.442**      
  (0.941)       (0.942       
Low Conflict     2.049***    1.523***     1.874***   
      (0.524)      (0.537)       (0.520)     
Somalia dummy     5.604***      7.320***   
      (1.934)        (1.781)     
Choke Point     1.858***    2.673***       
      0.700       (0.686)        
Anchorage  0.341***     0.322***      
  (0.092)       (0.098)       
Petty Piracy       1.387***     1.522***   
        (0.509)       (0.513)     
ln(Kuala)  -1.738**          
  (0.789)             
Log-likelihood  -28.008  -37.602  -117.029  -117.658        -115.939 
N  1682  1694  1728  1728  1728 
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 Table 7 Regression results for the intensity of piracy 
  10a  10b  11a  11b  12a  12b 
  Countries with at least one act of piracy  All countries 


















Constant  -1.306  -1.156  -1.228  -0.971  0.728  0.850 
  (1.910)  (1.746)  (1.922)  (1.735)  (2.110)  (1.907) 
Corruption Control  1.951**    1.919**    1.581*   
  (0.864)    (0.881)    (0.912)   
(Corruption Control)
2  -0.319***    -0.317***    -0.287**   
  (0.115)    (0.117)    (0.121)   
Govt effectiveness    1.972***    1.887**    1.674** 
    (0.746)    (0.742)    (0.762) 
Gov-eff-Sq    -0.290***    -0.279***    -0.264*** 
    (0.099)    (0.099)    (0.101) 
Deep Ports  0.200***  0.180***  0.185***  0.162***  0.179***  0.167*** 
  (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
lnGDP per capita  -0.241*  -0.307**  -0.233*  -0.304**  -0.474***  -0.569*** 
  (0.140)  (0.153)  (0.138)  (0.152)  (0.157)  (0.170) 
Anchorage     0.047*  0.054**  0.064**  0.069*** 
      (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Log-likelihood  -808.372  -812.912  -833.956  -839.204  -885.037  -892.453 
N  966  972  966  972  1694  1722 
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 Table 8: Piracy Dynamics 
 
  13a 13b    14  15 












Constant  7.461*** 7.461***  Constant  -5.757*** -6.41*** 
  (1.864)  (1.864)    (0.449)  (0.562) 
Lag s/a minor theft  11.88*** 11.995***  Lag att. minor theft  1.956*** 2.264*** 
  (3.48)  (30.635)    (0.437)  (0.539) 
Govt effectiveness   -0.317  Lag attacks on moving  1.134**  
    (1.498)    (0.517)   
(Govt effectiveness)
2   -0.071  Corruption Control  -2.227*** -2.298*** 
    (0.187)    (0.737)  (0.858) 
Interaction laggedminor* 
effectiveness 
5.44*** 5.593***  Govt effectiveness  1.614*** 1.4** 
  (1.572)  (1.651)    (0.62)  (0.673) 
Interaction laggedminor * 
effectiveness
2 
-0.649*** -0.651***  Anchorage  0.138*** 0.169*** 
  (0.21)  (0.219)    (0.058)  (0.051) 
Deep Ports  0.201*** 0.234***  Choke  1.96*** 1.89*** 
  (0.067)  (0.07)    (0.445)  (0.471) 
Drug dummy  1.788*** 1.683      
  (0.558)  (0.553)       
Civil conflict (level2)  2.468* 2.418      
  (1.413)  (1.403)       
Ln GDP per capita  -1.244*** -0.765***      
  (0.210)  (282)       
Log-likelihood  -454.471 -451.135  Log-likelihood  -140.666 -110.449 




Table 9: Sample Selection Example 
  16a  16b  16c 
Dependent variable  Attacks on stationary ships (minor theft type) 












Constant  -8.955  1.653 4.517*** 
  (8.859)  (9.332)  (1.732) 
Govt effectiveness  9.263**  4.58 -2.092*** 
  (4.152)  (4.306)  (0.428) 
Gov-eff-Sq  -1.12**  -0.618  
  (0.467)  (0.477)   
Drugs  1.296**  1.704** 1.899*** 
  (0.619)  (0.704)  (0.697) 
Deep Ports  1.06***  1.090*** 0.841*** 
  (0.312)  (0.31)  (0.298) 
Deep Ports-Sq  -0.511*  -0.053** -0.0439 
  (0.29)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
Log-likelihood  -341.267  -322.304 -330.962 
N  1350  1273  1273 
 
Countries missing from both restricted samples: Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep. Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, , Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, 
Iran, Islamic Rep., Iraq, Kenya, Korea, Dem. Rep., Liberia, Liberia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Togo, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen 
Additional countries missing from second sample: Algeria, Bulgaria, Georgia, Guatemala, Kiribati, Lebanon, Madagascar, Micronesia, Peru, Romania, Tonga, Vietnam 